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THESES
•	 Since	 taking	 power	 in	 China	 in	 2012,	 Xi	 Jinping	 has	 effected	
a	 fundamental	 change	 in	Beijing’s	 foreign	policy,	 abandoning	
the	principle	of	limited	external	activity.	China	has	undertaken	
initiatives	to	satisfy	its	territorial	claims	in	the	South	and	East	
China	Seas,	 shape	 its	neighbourhood,	 and	build	 and	promote	
multilateral	 economic	 and	 international	 security	 institutions	
which	would	be	parallel	to	Western	ones	(the	Asian	Infrastruc-
ture	Investment	Bank	AIIB	and	the	BRICS	Development	Bank).	
Beijing	has	also	launched	unprecedented	expansion	in	the	field	
of	foreign	investments.	Due	to	this	activity	in	the	sphere	of	for-
eign	policy,	the	scale	of	China’s	economic	involvement	and	the	
growing	number	of	ties	between	China	and	Europe,	the	ques-
tion	 regarding	 China’s	 vision	 of	 the	world	 has	 lost	 its	 purely	
academic	nature.	The	extent	to	which	the	Chinese	ruling	elites	
are	ready	to	adjust	to	the	present	political	and	economic	liberal	
international	 order	will	 have	 far-reaching	 consequences,	 not	
only	for	China’s	neighbours,	but	also	for	Europe	and	for	Poland.
•	 The	concept	of	the	New	Silk	Road,	officially	presented	in	the	au-
tumn	of	2013,	has	become	a	flagship	project	and	a	symbol	of	Chi-
na’s	aspirations	during	the	rule	of	Xi	Jinping.	At	first	glance,	this	
initiative,	referred	to	by	China	as	 ‘One	Belt,	One	Road’	(yi	dai 
yi	lu)	or	‘Belt	and	Road	Initiative’,	seems	to	be	a	purely	economic	
project	aimed	at	building	infrastructural	connections	between	
the	less	developed	regions	of	China	(i.e.	its	central	and	western	
provinces)	and	the	countries	of	the	European	Union.	However,	
the	significance	of	this	project	reaches	far	beyond	economic	is-
sues.	The	initiative,	which	to	a	great	extent	was	devised	as	a	re-
sponse	to	domestic	economic	challenges,	mainly	the	problem	of	
production	surplus,	has	been	transformed	into	a	more	compre-
hensive	vision	of	international	relations.	
•	 The	concept	of	the	New	Silk	Road	reflects	China’s	political	and	
economic	goals;	it	is	a	response	to	the	presence	of	other	powers	
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in	the	Eurasian	and	East	Asian	areas	as	broadly	understood,	
and	to	the	projects	these	powers	are	carrying	out	there.	It	is	
also	 a	 reflection	 of	 the	 scale	 of	 Beijing’s	 international	 ambi-
tions.	China	is	striving	to	build	durable	influence	in	the	coun-
tries	 of	 its	 neighbourhood,	 which	 would	 be	 independent	 of	
potential	 domestic	 changes	 in	 those	 countries.	 At	 the	 same	
time,	China’s	view	of	the	international	order	is	characterised	
by	a	functional	and	non-confrontational	understanding	of	the	
question	of	influence.	The	goal	of	China’s	economic	expansion	
is	to	win	external	markets	for	Chinese	trade	and	investments,	
and	prevent	the	emergence	of	barriers	to	access	to	these	mar-
kets	in	the	form	of	competitive	regional	initiatives	promoted	
by	other	powers.
•	 The	broad	definition	of	the	reach	of	the	New	Silk	Road,	from	
South-Eastern	and	Central	Asia	to	the	Middle	East	and	Central	
Europe,	combined	with	the	fact	that	nearly	all	the	potentially	
interested	 countries	 have	 been	 invited	 to	 participate	 in	 the	
initiative,	suggests	that	China	does	not	intend	to	build	its	own	
closed	regional	bloc,	but	 is	rather	trying	to	push	through	its	
own	unique	vision	of	globalisation.	At	the	same	time,	the	ab-
sence	of	the	USA	and	Japan	from	the	list	of	participants	in	the	
New	Silk	Road	project	proves	 that	China	views	 its	 initiative	
as	one	that	is	competitive	towards	other	regional	initiatives,	
both	the	American	and	the	Japanese	ones.	It	is	also	intended	to	
neutralise	Russia’s	Eurasian	Economic	Union.
•	 The	principles	and	standards	on	which	China	intends	to	base	
its	relations	with	the	partners	in	the	New	Silk	Road	project	
on	 remain	unclear.	This	 is	 largely	 due	 to	 the	 fact	 that	 it	 is	
a	unilateral	 initiative	created	by	 the	Chinese	 side	alone.	 In	
this	situation,	China	is	unwilling	to	institutionalise	the	pro-
ject.	 The	 funds	 that	 China	 has	 earmarked	 for	 the	 project’s	
implementation,	 including	for	the	creation	of	 the	Silk	Road	
Fund	and	the	AIIB	bank,	confirm	the	scale	of	its	involvement	
in	the	New	Silk	Road.
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•	 Under	the	New	Silk	Road	concept,	China	is	trying	to	merge	its	
traditional	way	 of	 thinking	 about	 the	 external	world	 (Sino-
centrism	and	a	preference	 for	bilateral	relations	with	weak-
er	states)	with	Western	 formats	 for	multilateral	cooperation	
such	as	development	banks	and	international	organisations.	
By	trying	to	pursue	China’s	ambitions	resulting	from	its	rise	
as	a	power,	Chinese	elites	concurrently	fear	taking	over	lead-
ership	in	the	region	and	assuming	responsibility	for	the	same.
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INTRODUCTION
This	publication	attempts	to	reconstruct	the	vision	of	internation-
al	order	as	currently	being	worked	out	by	the	Chinese	elites	and	
President	Xi	Jinping.	This	text	is	based	on	the	following:	analyses	
of	 speeches	 by	 China’s	 representatives	 and	 documents	 adopted	
by	the	Chinese	leadership;	a	study	of	semi-official	discourse,	i.e.	
articles	and	speeches	by	Chinese	researchers	and	experts	repre-
senting	research	centres	associated	with	China’s	leadership;	and	
interviews	with	analysts	and	researchers	conducted	during	 the	
author’s	stay	in	Taiwan	as	part	of	his	Taiwan	Fellowship.
Part	1	discusses	the	main	lines	of	the	ongoing	debate	on	China’s	
view	of	the	international	order	(the	‘Chinese	sphinx’).	Part	2	offers	
a	reconstruction	of	the	principles	on	which	China	intends	to	base	
its	vision	of	international	order	(China	dreams	of	a	community).	
Part	3	contains	a	discussion	of	two	key	elements	of	China’s	policy,	
the	New	Silk	Road	and	the	Asian	Infrastructure	Investment	Bank	
(Globalisation	the	Chinese	way).	Part	4	offers	a	discussion	of	cul-
tural	and	historical	factors	which,	in	the	author’s	opinion,	affect	
the	desired	shape	of	the	international	order	(The	imperial	herit-
age).	Part	5	focuses	on	the	impact	of	external	standards,	mainly	
those	promoted	by	Western	 states,	 on	 the	Chinese	vision	of	 the	
international	order	(External	influence).	The	final	part	examines	
the	question	of	to	what	extent	China	would	be	ready	to	take	over	
active	 leadership	 in	 the	 regional	 international	 order,	 and	what	
the	Chinese	vision	of	 this	order	would	mean	for	Europe	and	for	
Poland	(The	uncertain	leadership).
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I. THE ‘CHINESE SPHINX’
The	 question	 regarding	 the	 consequences	 of	 the	 rise	 of	 China’s	
position	in	the	international	arena	forms	the	central	axis	of	the	
debate	on	the	future	of	the	liberal	(Western)	international	order.	
This	question	has	gained	importance	in	the	aftermath	of	the	glob-
al	 economic	 crisis	 of	 the	 years	 2008–2009.	 China	 survived	 this	
crisis	as	one	of	the	countries	 least	affected	from	among	the	ma-
jor	actors	and,	as	a	consequence,	has	reduced	the	distance	which	
separated	 it	 from	Western	states,	mainly	 the	United	States.	The	
extent	to	which	the	Chinese	ruling	elites	are	ready	to	adjust	to	the	
present	political	and	economic	liberal	order	will	have	far-reach-
ing	consequences,	not	only	for	China’s	neighbours	from	Eastern	
and	Central	Asia,	but	also	for	European	states.
The ongoing debate in the West can be divided into two lines: 
the optimistic one and the pessimistic one.	Supporters	of	the	op-
timistic	version	argue	that	China	is	adjusting	to	the	Western	liberal	
order,	citing	China’s	membership	of	the	World	Trade	Organisation,	
its	 increasing	economic	 ties	with	 the	external	world	and	greater	
readiness	 to	 cooperate	 in	 the	 UN	 Security	 Council	 as	 examples.	
Supporters	of	the	pessimistic	variant,	on	the	other	hand,	view	Chi-
na’s	policy	as	a	series	of	further	challenges	to	the	West	and	a	dissent	
towards	standards	of	international	relations	as	promoted	by	West-
ern	states.	The	most	frequently	cited	arguments	include	China’s	ag-
gressive	behaviour	and	 territorial	claims	 in	 the	South	China	Sea	
and	 the	 economic	 expansion	 of	 Chinese	 state-controlled	 compa-
nies.	What	is	important,	the	division	into	optimists	and	pessimists	
does	not	depend	on	whether	the	particular	experts	deal	specifically	
with	China	or	are	experts	in	international	relations	in	general.	
Since	 the	 early	 2000s,	 the	 commentators’	 community	 has	 been	
largely	optimistic,	as	reflected	in	slogans	such	as	China’s	‘peace-
ful	 rise’	 and	 its	assuming	 the	role	of	a	 ‘responsible	 stakeholder’	
in	international	order.	However,	over	the	last	two	or	three	years	
this	optimism has been replaced with pessimism and fears of 
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‘China’s assertiveness’ and of rising Chinese-American rival-
ry.	China’s	actions	are	being	increasingly	referred	to	as	attempts	
to	build	 a	 zone	of	 influence,	 violations	 of	 international	 law	and	
a	display	of	revisionist	tendencies.	At	the	same	time,	due	to	over-
simplified	assessments	of	China’s	behaviour,	which	emphasise	for	
example	the	attempts	to	create	a	Sinocentric	international	order	
and	pursue	a	policy	of	 force,	certain	questions	are	never	asked.	
These	include	the	questions	of	the	nature	of	China’s	growth	in	the	
international	arena,	the	type	of	influence	China	intends	to	exert	
in	its	neighbourhood,	the	nature	of	its	relations	with	other	actors,	
and	the	type	of	leadership	it	intends	to	assume.
Observers	of	China’s	foreign	policy	agree	that	since	his	coming	to	
power	 in	 2012	Xi Jinping has managed to correct China’s ap-
proach towards international politics as hitherto applied. This	
change	 involves	abandoning	 two	principles	which	had	been	pro-
moted,	initially	by	Deng	Xiaoping,	since	the	late	1970s.	In	domestic	
politics,	this	was	the	formula	of	‘collective	leadership’,	meaning	the	
division	of	the	decision-making	capacity	and	responsibility	among	
several	 members	 of	 the	 Standing	 Committee	 of	 the	 Communist	
Party	of	China1.	In	foreign	policy,	the	principle	abandoned	was	the	
policy	of	limited	and	cautious	involvement	in	international	affairs	
(‘keeping	 a	 low	 profile’).	 Over	 recent	 decades,	 China	 has	 signifi-
cantly	opened	itself	up	to	the	world	and	involved	itself	in	multilat-
eral	cooperation	with	its	neighbours	within	ASEAN	and	the	Shang-
hai	Cooperation	Organisation.	At	 the	same	 time,	Chinese	 leaders	
did	not	show	any	particular	ambitions	in	the	international	arena,	
which	in	practice	meant	that	China	remained	outside	of	political	
and	military	 alliances;	had	no	 interest	 in	 global	 leadership;	 gave	
priority	to	relationships	with	the	United	States;	held	the	conviction	
that	it	would	not	become	a	superpower;	and	cherished	the	view	that	
diplomacy	is	mainly	intended	to	serve	economic	purposes2.	Beijing	
1	 With	the	reservation	that	it	did	not	involve	Deng	himself.
2	 Xu	Jini	Du	Zheyuan,	The	Dominant	Thinking	Sets	in	Chinese	Foreign	Policy	
Research:	A	Criticism,	The Chinese Journal of International Politics	8:3,	2015,	
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pursued	the	majority	of	 its	 foreign	policy	 in	 the	bilateral	 format,	
focusing	on	building	economic	ties,	opening	foreign	markets	to	its	
exports	and	importing	technology.
A fundamental change happened over the last three years.	
Xi	Jinping	has	largely	centralised	power	in	his	hands,	abandoning	
the	formula	of	‘collective	leadership’	applied	hitherto.	At	the	same	
time,	he	has	redefined	the	content	and	the	style	of	Chinese	foreign	
policy.	The	vision	devised	by	Xi	clearly	differs	from	the	‘low-pro-
file’	policy	and	opens	a	new	phase	in	the	development	of	China’s	
relations	with	the	external	world.	According	to	Yan	Xuetong,	one	
of	 the	most	publicly	 engaged	experts	 in	 international	 relations,	
in	 China’s	 policy	 “maintaining	 a	 low	profile”	 has	 been	 replaced	
with	 “striving	 for	 achievements”,	 and	 diplomacy	 which	 served	
economic	purposes	replaced	with	the	strategic	goal	of	renewing	
the	Chinese	nation3.	The	slogan	involving	‘renewing	the	Chinese	
nation’	is	seen	as	tantamount	to	the	intention	to	transform	China	
into	a	superpower	similar	to	the	USA.	China	is	increasingly	open	
to	the	idea	of	leading	others,	instead	of	merely	reacting	to	devel-
opments.	Voices	 in	 favour	 of	 considering	 the	need	 to	 build	 alli-
ances	began	to	emerge	in	Chinese	debate4.
The changes to China’s foreign policy have been reflected in 
the following acts:	
a)	 Beijing’s	specific	actions	to	pursue	its	territorial	claims	in	the	
East	and	South	China	Seas,	including	the	establishment	of	the	
p.	251–279;	Zhang	Feng,	Confucian	Foreign	Policy	Traditions	in	Chinese	His-
tory,	The Chinese Journal of International Politics,	8:2,	2015,	p.	197–218;	Sheng	
Ding,	A	Concealed	Regionalization	without	Historical	Roots:	A	New	Form	of	
Regionalism	in	Rising	China’s	Foreign	Policy,	in	Emilian	Kavalski	(ed.),	China 
and the global politics of regionalization,	Ashgate:	Farnham	and	Burlington	
2009,	p.	33–45.
3	 Xu	and	Du,	op. cit.
4	 Yan	Xuetong,	China-U.S.	Competition	for	Strategic	Partners,	China-US Focus,	
29	October	2015,	http://www.chinausfocus.com/foreign-policy/china-u-s-
competition-for-strategic-partners/
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Air	Defence	 Identification	Zone	 (AIDZ)	and	 the	 formation	of	
artificial	islands;	
b)	 its	active	approach	to	shaping	China’s	neighbourhood,	includ-
ing	by	promoting	the	concept	of	the	New	Silk	Road;	
c)	 building	and	promoting	multilateral	institutions	in	the	sphere	
of	the	economy	(AIIB	and	the	BRICS	Development	Bank)	and	
security	in	Asia	(CICA)	which	would	be	parallel	to	Western	in-
stitutions;	
d)	 increased	 involvement	 in	 the	 UN	 forum,	 including	 in	 the	
sphere	of	international	security	and	economic	development;	
e)	 readiness	to	cooperate	in	combating	climate	change;	
f)	 active	diplomacy	at	the	highest	level	–	during	the	three	years	
of	his	rule	Xi	has	visited	several	dozen	states;	
g)	 unprecedented	economic	expansion	 in	outward	foreign	 invest-	
ment,	whose	level	in	2015	exceeded	the	level	of	foreign	invest-
ment	in	China.
The	correction	of	China’s	foreign	policy,	the	new	vision	of	inter-
national	order	and	the	concept	of	the	New	Silk	Road	have	all	been	
authorised	by	Xi	Jinping.	At	the	same	time,	it	should	be	remem-
bered	that	the	roots of these ideas reach back to 2008 and the 
global economic crisis.	This	was	when	Chinese	elites	rapidly	be-
came	more	confident,	began	to	view	the	United	States	as	a	‘declin-
ing	power’	and	identified	a	strategic	opportunity	to	improve	the	
quality	of	China’s	international	status5.
5	 Interviews	with	researchers	from	Taiwan	(2016).
P
O
IN
T 
O
F 
V
IE
W
  1
0/
20
16
13
II. CHINA DREAMS OF A COMMUNITY
The	 ideas	 present	 in	 the	narrative	 promoted	 by	Chinese	 elites	
facilitate	understanding	of	how	China	sees	itself	and	the	world	
around	it.	The	change	initiated	by	Xi	Jinping	has	been	accompa-
nied	by	an	array	of	 slogans	and	goals6.	The	mere	enumeration	
thereof	 shows	 the scale of China’s ambitions:	 ‘China	dream’,	
‘the	rejuvenation	of	 the	great	Chinese	nation’,	 ‘a	community	of	
destiny’,	‘periphery	diplomacy’,	‘a	new	type	of	relationships	be-
tween	powers’,	‘new	international	relations’,	‘win-win	coopera-
tion’,	 ‘the	new	concept	of	security	 in	Asia’,	 ‘the	Asia	dream’.	 In	
addition,	a	series	of	‘century	goals’	have	been	set:	to	make	China	
a	 society	of	moderate	prosperity	by	2021,	which	will	mark	 the	
one	hundredth	anniversary	of	the	establishment	of	the	Commu-
nist	Party	of	China,	and	to	make	China	a	modern	socialist	state	
by	2049,	 i.e.	 one	hundred	years	 since	 the	establishment	of	 the	
People’s	Republic	of	China.	However, not all of these slogans 
reflect China’s thinking of the external world and its evolu-
tion in the same way.
Firstly,	 it	 is	 an	 element	 of	 political	 and	 bureaucratic	 culture,	
and	a	particular	ritual,	for the new leader to introduce their 
own ‘political glossary’	which	will	 later	become	their	heritage	
in	the	history	of	the	Communist	party	doctrine.	During	the	rule	
of	the	previous	leader	Hu	Jintao	and	Prime	Minister	Wen	Jiabao	
(2002–2012),	the	main	slogans	included	‘harmonious	society’	and	
a	 ‘harmonious	world’	 to	 be	 based	 on	multilateralism,	 economic	
cooperation,	 respect	 for	 civilisational	differences	 and	 reform	of	
the	United	Nations.
6	 The	new	leader	of	China	has	presented	his	creed	as	regards	foreign	policy	in	
several	important	speeches,	including	during	a	conference	in	2013	focused	
on	China’s	relations	with	its	neighbours,	in	2014	during	a	party	conference	
dedicated	to	international	affairs,	and	at	a	summit	organised	during	the	
2014	Conference	on	Interaction	and	Confidence-Building	Measures	in	Asia	
(CICA).
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Secondly,	 some of the ideas have propaganda significance 
alone, and	as	such	do	not	facilitate	the	understanding	of	the	Chi-
nese	view	of	international	reality.	Some	are	too	general	in	their	
content.	Interpreting	the	slogan	of	‘new	type	of	great	power	rela-
tionships’,	promoted	by	Xi	Jinping	as	regards	Chinese-American	
relations,	can	serve	as	an	example	of	such	an	idea.	The	essence	of	
this	slogan	is	‘mutual	respect	and	win-win	cooperation’.	As	long	as	
China	does	not	specify	its	understanding	of	the	term	‘respect’,	it	
would	be	impossible	to	define	how	Chinese-American	political	re-
lations	should	be	organised.	The	slogans	referring	to	‘friendship,	
honesty,	mutuality	and	accessibility’,	which	is	how	Xi	described	
the	principles	on	which	China	needs	to	base	its	relations	with	its	
neighbours,	remain	equally	enigmatic.
At	the	same	time,	specific	ideas	can	be	identified	which	illustrate	
how	 Chinese	 elites	 interpret	 international	 reality.	 The	 above-
mentioned	 slogans	 reflect	 certain	 Sinocentric ideas.	 Slogans	
such	as	 ‘the	China	dream’	or	 ‘the	rejuvenation	of	 the	great	Chi-
nese	nation’	suggest	that	China	occupies	a	central	place	in	the	in-
ternational	order,	and	thus	also	how	they	are	treated	by	smaller	
countries	–	as	a	reflection	of	China’s	aspirations	to	dominate	the	
region	 and	 the	 neighbourhood.	 Xi	 has	 also	 called	 for	 a	unique 
Chinese approach towards diplomacy,	 to	 be	 characterised	by	
the	necessity	to	build	global	partnerships	based	on	the	principle	
of	non-involvement.
Similarly,	 it	 is	 evident	 that	 the	 ideas	 promoted	 are	 ones	which	
would	 have	 a	 strong potential to attract possible partners.	
The	most	 important	of	 these	 ideas	 is	 the	 ‘community of desti-
ny’.	When	promoting	this	 idea,	Xi	has	pointed	to	the	priority	of	
relationships	 with	 the	 neighbours	 (‘periphery	 diplomacy’),	 and	
deemed	 them	more	 important	 than	 the	 relationships	with	 spe-
cific	 powers.	He	 also	 emphasised	 the	need	 for	China	 to	use	 the	
‘strategic	window’	 through	which	 to	 improve	 its	 relations	with	
its	neighbours.	Xi	stressed	the	need	to	enhance	political	goodwill,	
deepen	regional	economic	 integration,	 increase	China’s	cultural	
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influence	and	improve	regional	security	cooperation7.	The	‘com-
munity	of	destiny’	clearly	shows	China’s	interest	in	deepening	its	
cooperation	with	its	neighbours.	Secondly,	the	Chinese	leader	has	
emphasised	the	need	to	pursue	‘common development’,	as	a	re-
sult	of	which	China’s	economic	growth	and	development	would	be	
favourable	for	its	neighbours;	he	also	stressed	the	importance	of	
‘joint	benefits’.	The	community	of	destiny	is	therefore	intended	to	
reach	beyond	the	issues	of	bilateral	economic	cooperation,	and	to	
open	the	way	not	so	much	to	China	imposing	its	vision	as	China	
and	other	involved	parties	devising	plans	for	their	future	cooper-
ation.	Moreover,	Xi	Jinping	emphasised	the	importance	of	inter-
relations,	and	argued	that	closer	ties	between	China	and	the	ex-
ternal	world	would	be	an	opportunity	and	would	bring	potential	
benefits	to	Beijing.	The	‘community	of	destiny’	has	been	combined	
with	 the	 potential	 implementation	 of	 the	 ‘Asia dream’,	 which	
could	be	interpreted	as	an	attempt	to	reduce	the	negative	mean-
ing	of	the	concept	of	‘the	China	dream’	as	understood	by	China’s	
potential	partners.
At	 the	 same	 time,	 frequent	 references	 to	 ‘the new type of in-
ternational relations’	 and	to	 ‘the new type great powers re-
lations’	 suggest	 that	China	remains	sceptical	about	 the	present	
international	order,	and	would	like	to	replace	it	with	a	version	of	
this	 order	which	would	 be	 devised	with	Beijing’s	 participation.	
This	 line	 of	 reasoning	was	 reflected	 in	 the	 appeal	 to	 the	Asian	
nations	to	build	a	new	security	architecture	in	Asia	–	preferably	
without	the	participation	of	the	United	States.
7	 Min	Ye,	China	and	Competing	Cooperation	in	Asia-Pacific:	TPP,	RCEP,	and	
the	New	Silk	Road,	Asian Security,	11:3,	2015,	p.	218.
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III. GLOBALISATION – THE CHINESE WAY 
The	New	Silk	Road	and	the	AIIB	bank	are	attempts	to	transform	
general	ideas	into	a	specific	vision	of	international	order	in	Asia	
and	 Eurasia.	 The New Silk Road is China’s unilateral initia-
tive,	for	which	Beijing	is	seeking	partners.	The AIIB, on the other 
hand, is a typical multilateral institution,	a	development	bank	
modelled	 on	Western	 financial	 institutions	 rooted	 in	 the	 Bret-
ton	Woods	system.	Even	though	formally	the	AIIB	is	not	an	ele-
ment	of	 the	New	Silk	Road	concept,	Beijing	has	announced	that	
it	would	like	this	particular	bank	to	fund	investments	under	the	
Road	initiative.	This	situation	makes	it	possible	to	analyse	the	two	
institutions	 jointly,	 the	more	 so	because	 they	 jointly	 reflect	one	
key	feature	which	is	present	in	the	Chinese	vision	of	international	
order,	i.e.	a	combination	of	Chinese	ideas	and	traditions	which	are	
rooted	in	the	country’s	history	with	external,	Western	standards	
of	regionalism	and	multilateralism.
The	starting	point	is	the	scope	of	the	Chinese	concept:	how	China	
defines	 the	region,	what	Beijing’s	degree	of	openness	 to	partici-
pants	 in	 the	project	will	be,	and	what	 its	approach	 towards	 the	
presence	of	actors	from	outside	the	region,	mainly	other	powers,	
will	be.
The	key	feature	of	China’s	New	Silk	Road	project	is	its	extra-re-
gional nature.	The	key	components	of	the	New	Silk	Road	include	
the	following	areas:	Central	Asia	(in	the	form	of	the	Silk	Road	Eco-
nomic	Belt),	South-Eastern	and	Southern	Asia	(in	the	form	of	the	
21st-century	Maritime	Silk	Road),	and	Pakistan	(in	the	form	of	the	
China-Pakistan	 Economic	 Corridor).	 These	 three	 directions	 de-
fine	the	scope	of	China’s	greatest	interest	and	the	largest	potential	
investments.	The	Road	does	not	 limit	itself	to	the	partner	coun-
tries	from	China’s	neighbourhood.	It	also	comprises	several	tran-
sit	regions	and	countries:	Central	and	Eastern	Europe,	the	South	
Caucasus,	Turkey	and	 the	Middle	East	 region,	and	 the	Balkans.	
Russia	occupies	a	separate	place	in	China’s	concept.	The	European	
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Union	as	a	whole	is	the	main	target	of	the	‘transport’	section	of	the	
Road	 involving	 the	 construction	 of	 infrastructural	 connections	
from	China	 to	 the	European	market.	Moreover,	 some	observers	
point	to	the	possibility	of	building	a	branch	of	the	Road	leading	to	
Latin	America.	Such	a	broad	definition	of	the	scope	of	the	project,	
and	the	fact	that	almost	all	the	potentially	interested	states	have	
been	invited	to	participate	in	it,	indicates	that	the Chinese con-
cept is not limited to one region. This openness is tantamount 
to a desire for the globalisation rather the than regionalisa-
tion of international politics.	The	composition	of	the	Asian	In-
frastructure	 Investment	Bank	reflects	 the	scale	of	 the	New	Silk	
Road	project:	it	has	57	founding	states	from	Asia	and	Europe.
The	absence	of	the	key	actors,	the	USA	and	Japan,	stands	in	con-
trast	to	the	Road’s	open	nature8.	The	place	of	India	remains	un-
certain,	although	its	membership	of	the	AIIB	suggests	that	it	will	
be	 included	 in	 China’s	 vision	 of	 international	 order.	 The fact 
that the USA and Japan have been omitted	clearly shows that	
China views its project as one that is competitive with other 
regional initiatives, both American and Japanese.	According	
to	 some	 researchers,	 this	 is	 because	 priority	 is	 no	 longer	 given	
to	 Chinese-American	 relations.	 Other	 researchers	 argue	 that	 it	
is	proof	of	China’s	intention	to	build	a	political	and	ethical	alter-
native	to	the	United	States,	and	to	show	that	the	rise	of	China	as	
a	power	may	have	positive	consequences	for	smaller	states.	In	the	
case	of	the	USA,	Beijing	is	primarily	trying	to	counterbalance	the	
Trans-Pacific	Partnership	Project	(TPP)9.	Strong	competition	be-
tween	China	and	Japan	can	be	observed	as	regards	building	eco-
nomic	influence	in	Eastern	Asian	states,	and	to	a	lesser	extent	in	
Central	Asia,	for	example	in	high-speed	rail	projects.
The principles and norms on which China intends to base its 
relations with its partners under the New Silk Road project 
8	 Aside	from	these	two	states,	North	Korea	and	Taiwan	are	also	absent.
9	 Min	Ye,	op. cit.,	p.	208–212.
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remain unclear.	 This	 largely	 results	 from	 the	 fact	 that	 it	 is	
a	 unilateral	 initiative	which,	 in	 contrast	 to	 declarations,	 is	 be-
ing	created	by	the	Chinese	side	alone.	Beijing	shows	no	intention	
to	 explicitly	 define	 these	 principles.	 The	main	document	 defin-
ing	general	spheres	of	cooperation	is	the	 ‘Vision	and	Actions	on	
Jointly	Building	the	Silk	Road	Economic	Belt	and	the	21st-Century	
Maritime	Silk	Road’10	adopted	in	2015.	It	presents,	albeit	obliquely,	
the	general	principles	China	would	 like	 to	apply	 to	 its	 relations	
with	 its	 partners	 in	 the	New	 Silk	 Road	 project.	 Beijing	 has	 not	
moved	beyond	general	statements	such	as	‘win-win	cooperation’.	
The	 focus	 on	 specific	 infrastructural	 initiatives	 and	 the	 lack	 of	
universal	 standards	are	 intended	 to	 show	China’s	 friendly	 face,	
in	contrast	 to	what	 the	Chinese	authorities	 refer	 to	as	 ‘Western	
imperialism’.	The	AIIB	is	intended	to	operate	according	to	clearly	
defined	rules,	but	its	international	legal	framework	is	still	being	
devised	by	the	member	states.	Referring	to	these	high-flown	slo-
gans,	some	researchers	interpret	China’s	behaviour	as	paternal-
istic,	and	intended	as	a	moral	mission	to	make	the	world	a	better	
place	by	propagating	Chinese	ideas11.
The	vague	nature	of	 the	standards	on	which	the	Chinese	vision	
of	international	order	is	based	is	related	to	China’s	dislike of in-
stitutionalisation.	 Usually,	 dominant	 states	 view	 institutions	
as	tools	to	utilise	and	consolidate	their	advantage.	In	the	case	of	
the	New	Silk	Road,	China’s	reluctance	to	introduce	rules	to	be	fol-
lowed	by	all	the	participants	is	evident.	Such	rules	would	also	lim-
it	Beijing’s	room	for	manoeuvre.	In	this	way,	the	New	Silk	Road	is	
becoming	a	special	kind	of	a	universal	‘umbrella’	spread	over	Chi-
na’s	current	practice	of	building	up	bilateral	relations.	It	should	be	
10	 Vision	and	Actions	on	Jointly	Building	the	Silk	Road	Economic	Belt	and	the	
21st-Century	Maritime	Silk	Road	(Beijing:	National	Development	and	Reform	
Commission,	Ministry	of	Foreign	Affairs,	and	Ministry	of	Commerce	of	the	
People’s	Republic	of	China,	with	State	Council	authorization,	March	2015,	
http://en.ndrc.gov.cn/newsrelease/201503/t20150330_669367.html
11	 William	A.	Callahan,	China’s	‘‘Asia	Dream’’:	The	Belt	Road	Initiative	and	the	
new	regional	order,	Asian Journal of Comparative Politics,	advance	online	pub-
lication	2016,	p.	1–18.
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expected	that	under	the	Road’s	concept	China	will	pursue	a	versa-
tile	policy	towards	specific	states	and	projects,	and	will	not	intend	
to	devise	one	universal	political	formula.	China	suggests	that	it	is	
ready	to	‘serve	as	an	example’	and	encourage	other	states	to	follow	
this	example,	without	the	need	to	define	common	rules	for	all.
The	scale	of	China’s	involvement	in	the	New	Silk	Road	project	is	
reflected	 in	 the	 level	of	funding which China has earmarked 
for the project’s implementation.	There	are	two	main	sources	
of	this	funding.	The	first,	that	depends	on	Beijing	alone,	is	the	Silk	
Road	 Fund	which	 has	 US$40	 billion	 at	 its	 disposal.	 The	 second	
source	is	the	AIIB	bank,	whose	initial	capital	amounts	to	US$100	
billion.	This	is	supplemented	by	individual	initiatives	carried	out	
in	 connection	with	 the	 visits	 paid	 by	 the	Chinese	 leadership	 to	
partner	states.	Pakistan	is	one	example.	As	part	of	the	construc-
tion	of	the	China-Pakistan	corridor,	Pakistan	is	to	receive	invest-
ments	worth	US$46	billion	over	the	next	ten	years.	Some	of	these	
investments	may	 be	 funded	 by	 the	 Silk	 Road	 Fund	 or	 the	 AIIB	
bank,	but	 it	 is	certain	 that	additional	 funds	will	be	made	avail-
able	as	well.	Most	of	the	spending	will	be	authorised	by	the	Chi-
nese	side.	As	a	consequence,	a	large	part	of	the	partners	may	face	
the	dilemma	of	whether	to	take	advantage	of	the	Chinese	offer	on	
China’s	terms,	or	to	withdraw	completely	from	Chinese	funding.
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IV. THE IMPERIAL HERITAGE…
China’s	 vision	 of	 international	 order	 is	 strongly	 influenced	 by	
the	country’s	history.	It	should	be	noted	that	China’s	history	and	
the	history	of	China’s	activity	on	the	international	stage	contain	
a	 number	 of	 paradoxes.	 It	 would	 be	wrong	 to	 seek	 a	 universal	
reference	 to	China’s	history.	China	has	gone	 through	periods	of	
peace	and	periods	of	aggression;	it	isolated	itself	from	the	world,	
and	then	became	more	open.	At	the	same	time,	certain	elements	
in	China’s	history	continue	to	influence	the	ruling	elites	and	con-
tribute	to	how	their	visions	and	ideas	of	international	order	are	
shaped.
In	 line	with	 the	concept	of	Sinocentrism,	China	views	 itself	as	
the	only	central,	superior	and	sovereign	entity,	which	is	often	en-
titled	to	shape	the	policy	of	the	countries	in	its	neighbourhood12.	
Sometimes,	this	concept	is	presented	in	a	rather	blunt	and	literal	
manner:	China	is	a	very	big	country,	whereas	other	countries	are	
small.	Some	researchers	argue	that	China	is	not	familiar	with	the	
very	terms	of	sovereignty	and	sovereign	equality,	and	that	it	only	
understands	the	concept	of	superiority13.	The	Sinocentric	vision	of	
the	world	is	inseparably	connected	with	the	Chinese	authorities’	
intention	to	hold	power	on	two	fronts,	the	domestic	and	the	exter-
nal.	The	unique	position	of	the	emperor	of	China	within	China’s	
political	system	could	be	recognised	only	when	the	external	world	
accepted	this	superiority14.	The	concept	of	Sinocentrism	is	often	
associated	with	the	concept	of	a	tribute	system,	which	is	a	point	
of	 reference	 for	 contemporary	 thinking	about	 the	 role	of	China	
12	 Zhang	Feng,	Regionalization	in	the	Tianxia?	Continuity	and	Change	in	Chi-
na’s	Foreign	Policy,	in	Kavalski	(ed.),	China	and	the	global	politics	of	regiona-
lization,	Ashgate:	Farnham	and	Burlington	2009,	p.	20–21.
13	 Interviews	with	researchers	from	Taiwan	carried	out	in	2016;	Jeremy	Paltiel,	
China’s	Regionalization	Policies:	Illiberal	Internationalism	or	Neo-Mencian	
Benevolence?,	in	Emilian	Kavalski	(ed.),	China	and	the	global	politics	of	re-
gionalization,	Ashgate:	Farnham	and	Burlington,	p.	47.
14	 Zhang	Feng,	Regionalization	in	the	Tianxia…, op. cit.
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today.	However,	it	should	be	remembered	that	this	is	an	analyti-
cal	concept	devised	by	Western	historians,	rather	than	a	perma-
nent	element	of	China’s	history.
The absence of the concept of a region	 from	China’s	 thinking	
about	the	external	world	is	a	consequence	of	the	Sinocentric	view	
of	the	world.	China	was	never	a	part	of	any	region,	because	it	was	
in	the	centre	of	its	own	civilisation.	This	is	reflected	in	the	Chi-
nese	term	tianxia –	meaning	‘all	under	heaven’.	According	to	this	
term,	the	world	is	composed	of	both	the	Chinese	empire	and	the	
adjacent	 territories15.	 As	 a	 consequence,	 international	 relations	
are	viewed	as	a	reflection	of	bilateral	relations	between	the	cen-
tre	and	the	periphery16.	However,	numerous	observers	claim	that	
this	vision	translates	 into	China’s	present	policy	to	only	a	small	
degree.	The	Chinese	elites	seem	to	cherish	an	abstract	nostalgia	
and	a	longing	for	the	status	of	the	Middle	Kingdom,	rather	than	
a	specific	Sinocentric	view	of	the	world17.
China’s	preference for bilateral relations	is	deeply	rooted	in	the	
country’s	history.	China	prefers	flexible	bilateral	relations.	This	
has	 prompted	 some	 researchers	 to	 conclude	 that	 China	 has	 no	
strategy,	as	understood	as	a	set	of	universal	 rules	of	how	to	deal	
with	 the	external	world.	 It	 seems	 that	 the	 rules	are	adjusted	 to	
specific	 circumstances.	 China’s	 preference	 for	 bilateralism	 is	
15	 Zhang	Feng,	Rethinking	the	“tribute	system”:	broadening	the	conceptual	
horizon	of	historical	East	Asian	politics,	in	Yongnian	Zheng	(ed.),	China	and	
International	Relations.	The	Chinese	view	and	the	contribution	of	Wang	
Gungwu,	 Abingdon	 and	New	York:	 Routledge	 2010,	 p.	 75–101;	 Yongnian	
Zheng,	Organizing	China’s	inter-state	relations.	From	“tianxia”	(all-under-
heaven)	to	the	modern	international	order,	in	Yongnian	Zheng	(ed.),	China	
and	International	Relations.	The	Chinese	view	and	the	contribution	of	Wang	
Gungwu,	Abingdon	and	New	York:	Routledge	2010,	p.	293–321.
16	 Nadine	Godehardt,	China	and	the	definition	of	the	Asian	region,	in	Nadine	
Godehardt,	Dirk	Nabers	(ed.),	Regional	Powers	and	Regional	Orders,	Rout-
ledge:	Abingdon	and	New	York	2011,	p.	119–120.
17	 Chih-yu	Shih,	Chiung-chiu	Huang,	China’s	Quest	for	Grand	Strategy:	Power,	
National	Interest,	or	Relational	Security,	The Chinese Journal of International 
Politics,	8:1,	2016,	p.	1–26.
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often	connected	with	its	limited intention to influence the ex-
ternal world	and	Beijing’s	tradition	of	reducing	its	external	in-
volvement	(which	is	not	tantamount	to	a	policy	of	peace).	In	the	
Chinese	tradition	of	political	thinking,	responsibility	for	the	ex-
ternal	world	is	significantly	limited18.
18	 Interviews	with	researchers	from	Taiwan	carried	out	in	2016;	Xiao	Ren,	Tra-
ditional	Chinese	theory	and	practice	of	foreign	relations.	A	reassessment,	in	
Yongnian	Zheng	(ed.),	China	and	International	Relations.	The	Chinese	view	
and	the	contribution	of	Wang	Gungwu,	Abingdon	and	New	York:	Routledge	
2010,	p.	102–116.
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V. … AND EXTERNAL INFLUENCE
Numerous	 researchers	 refer	 to	China	as	 a	power	 that	 is	 ‘learn-
ing’	international	politics.	Both	the	New Silk Road concept and 
the AIIB bank show that Western ideas have considerably 
influenced the Chinese vision of the international order.	Re-
gardless	of	its	unique	historical	experience,	contemporary	China	
is	unable	to	separate	itself	from	the	external	world.	Over	the	last	
two	decades,	China	has	become	involved	in	cooperation	with	mul-
tilateral	institutions	at	both	the	global	and	regional	levels.	In	this	
way,	 Beijing	 intends	 to	 increase	 its	 involvement	 in	multilateral	
cooperation,	with	its	rules	and	standards,	even	if	it	continues	to	
prefer	flexibility,	i.e.	a	situation	in	which	rules	can	be	adjusted	to	
specific	circumstances.
There	 are	 several	 main	 sources	 which	 influence	 how	 Chinese	
elites	think	about	the	regional	order	in	Asia:	
1. experience	and	reactive	involvement	with	ASEAN;	
2. forms	of	hegemony	as	pursued	by	the	United	States,	
3. globalisation;	
4. the	concepts	of	regionalism	and	multilateralism.
China	has	remained	under	the	influence	of	the Asian experience 
of multilateralism	for	the	last	three	decades.	Other	states	initi-
ated	these	processes,	whereas	China	could	only	join	them	or	stay	
outside.	Unlike	European	regionalism,	Asian	regionalism	focused	
on	economic,	political	and	security	cooperation	in	which	the	prin-
ciples	of	non-involvement	and	non-interference	were	applied19.
The	key	feature	of	the	New	Silk	Road	project,	one	which	is	direct-
ly	associated	with	China’s support for the concept of globali-
sation,	 is	 its	open	nature	and	 intention	 to	maintain	China’s	ac-
cess	to	external	markets.	This	suggests	that	by	implementing	the	
19	 Min	Ye,	op. cit.,	p.	209.
P
O
IN
T 
O
F 
V
IE
W
  1
0/
20
16
24
Road	project	Beijing	intends,	among	other	things,	to	prevent	the	
regionalisation	of	global	trade	and	stop	the	attempts	to	build	bar-
riers	isolating	a	specific	region	from	the	rest	of	the	world.	These	
attempts	 include	 the	Trans-Pacific	 Partnership	 (TPP)	 promoted	
by	the	United	States	and	the	Eurasian	Economic	Union	promoted	
by	Russia.
At	the	same	time,	China is willing to imitate the United States:	
it	 tries	 to	shape	and	change	other	countries	according	to	stand-
ards	similar	to	those	used	by	the	USA	and	bypass	the	rules	it	it-
self	devised.	China	is	 learning	from	the	West	 ‘how	to	be	a	great	
power’	and	how	to	behave	like	one20.	Both	the	AIIB	and	the	Silk	
Road	Fund	are	China’s	attempts	 to	 show	 ‘positive’	behaviour	on	
the	international	stage.
20	 Yongnian	Zheng,	op. cit.,	p.	307–308.
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VI. THE UNCERTAIN LEADERSHIP
Xi	Jinping	has	used	vivid	language	to	emphasise	the	significance	
of	the	New	Silk	Road	concept,	saying	that	China	the	eagle	can	fly	
higher	and	farther,	once	its	wings,	meaning	the	Silk	Road	Econom-
ic	Belt	and	Maritime	Silk	Road,	have	been	constructed21.	Obviously,	
the	very	fact	that	Beijing	has	devised	its	own	vision	of	the	interna-
tional	order	does	not	mean	that	China	will	manage	to	implement	it.	
Numerous	states	have	seen	that	the	way	from	an	idea	to	its	imple-
mentation	is	long	and	frequently	impossible	to	cover.	Regardless	of	
the	significant	ongoing	centralisation	of	power	under	Xi	Jinping,	
the	process	of	shaping	and	implementing	foreign	policy	continues	
to	be	strongly	influenced	by	numerous	domestic	actors	who	have	
their	own	interests	in	specific	sectors.	Managing	the	reception	of	
China’s	concepts	 in	the	states	at	which	China’s	policy	 is	 targeted	
is	an	even	bigger	challenge	for	Beijing.	However,	even	in	the	pres-
ence	of	these	reservations,	it	would	be	good	to	establish	what kind 
of international order China would like to emerge.
In	most	cases,	the	success	of	regional	 initiatives	depends	on	the	
clarity	of	the	vision	of	leadership	and	the	readiness	to	assume	po-
litical	and	economic	responsibility.	In	the	case	of	China,	its lack 
of determination to assume leadership and responsibility	
is	clearly	evident.	The	Chinese	vision	is	based	on	two	main	con-
cepts:	the	‘China	dream’	and	‘the	community	of	fate/destiny’.	The	
combination	of	these	two	slogans	illustrates	the	tension	between	
Beijing’s	intention	to	pursue	its	ambitions	and	its	fear	of	assuming	
regional	leadership	and	responsibility.	
As	a	consequence,	several	domestic tensions	are	present	in the 
Chinese vision of international order:
a)	 between	 Sinocentrism	 and	 a	 broader	 vision	 of	 the	 region	
which	other	states	would	consider	attractive,	
21	 Quoted	after	Min	Ye,	op. cit.,	p.	219–220.
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b)	 between	China’s	acceptance	of	the	present	order	and	its	inten-
tion	to	devise	its	own	rules,	
c)	 between	 the	 will	 to	 independently	 lead	 the	 construction	 of	
the	region	and	consent	to	let	others	take	part	in	the	decision-
making	process.	
China	 is	 trying	 to	balance the bilateral and the multilateral 
dimensions of its foreign policy.	On	the	one	hand,	Beijing	has	
gathered	 significant	 experience	 in	 building	 bilateral	 relations	
and	the	economic	expansion	resulting	from	them,	which	was	fre-
quently	followed	by	increased	political	 influence.	China	intends	
to	retain	its	room	for	manoeuvre	and	make	the	content	of	its	rela-
tions	dependent	on	its	bilateral	relations	with	specific	actors.	At	
the	same	 time,	Beijing	 is	 trying	 to	build	 its	 influence	 in	a	more	
systematic	manner,	 targeting	 a	 bigger	number	 of	 actors.	 In	 the	
case	of	the	New	Silk	Road	its	uni-	and	bilateral	component	is	par-
ticularly	strong.	It	gives	China	much	room	for	manoeuvre	and	fa-
cilitates	the	 implementation	of	the	concept,	without	the	need	to	
assume	responsibility	in	an	explicit	manner.	On	the	other	hand,	
the	establishment	of	the	AIIB	with	the	participation	of	a	number	
of	states	from	Asia	and	Europe	is	proof	of	China’s	fear	of	assuming	
leadership	in	the	region.	In	the	case	of	the	AIIB,	a	strategy	aimed	
to	counteract	American	dominance	is	evident.	At	the	same	time,	
China	expects	others	–	for	example,	European	states	–	to	assume	
at	least	partial	responsibility	for	it.
Under	the	New	Silk	Road	initiative,	China intends to build up 
durable influence in the states located in its neighbourhood,	
which	 would	 be	 independent	 of	 potential	 domestic	 changes.	
At	 the	 same	 time,	Beijing	 is	 torn	between	 its	 intention	 to	 cre-
ate	a	regional	order	based	on	Chinese	leadership	and	its	will	to	
share	the	responsibility	with	other	states.	One	of	the	fundamen-
tal	causes	of	this	situation	is	a	deeply-rooted	dislike	of	building	
an	order	which	would	be	based	on	universal	standards	compris-
ing	 all	 the	 involved	 parties.	 Instead,	 China	 prefers	 a	 flexible	
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approach	which	enables	it	to	shape	its	relations	with	each	of	the	
involved	parties.
China’s	vision	of	international	order	is	characterised	by	a	func-
tional understanding of influence.	China	would	prefer	an	 in-
ternational	order	which	would	facilitate	its	economic	expansion,	
help	gain	access	to	external	markets	for	Chinese	trade	and	invest-
ments,	and	make	it	possible	to	by-pass	certain	regional	initiatives	
promoted	by	other	powers	(which	could	form	a	barrier	to	the	Chi-
nese	economy).	
This	 approach	 is	 also	 a	method	 of	 concealing	 China’s	 economic	
expansion	 under	 the	mask	 of	multilateral	 cooperation,	 thereby	
minimising	political	aspirations	which	the	partners	may	view	as	
posing	a	threat	to	their	interests.	The	standards	on	which	China	
intends	to	base	its	international	order	indicate	that	Beijing	is	only	
slightly	 interested	 in	 official	 announcements	 by	 the	 states	 in-
volved	in	the	project	that	they	would	accept	China’s	leading	role	in	
the	initiative.	The	real	benefits	seem	to	matter	much	more,	main-
ly	involving	openness	to	China’s	economic	expansion.	The	form	of	
influence	seems	to	be	much	less	important	than	the	content.
The	New	Silk	Road	 is	an attempt to build a parallel interna-
tional order, rather than one that would be an alternative to 
the liberal international order.	The	project	is	not	protectionist	
and	closed	–	on	the	contrary,	 it	 is	open	and	oriented	at	stronger	
economic	 cooperation.	 The	 fact	 that	 European	 countries	 were	
invited	 to	 participate	 in	 the	 AIIB	 and	 that	 attempts	 have	 been	
made	 to	 include	 the	 Eurasian	 Economic	Union	 in	 the	New	 Silk	
Road	 shows	 that	China	 is	 trying	 to	 complement	 the	present	or-
der	rather	than	replace	it	with	its	own	institutions.	At	the	same	
time,	 China	 intends	 to	 present	 poorer	 states	 with	 an	 offer	 the	
West	 never	 had	 for	 them:	 to	 provide	 them	with	 infrastructure	
and	 technology.	 The	 functioning	 of	 the	AIIB	 bank	 and	 the	 Silk	
Road	Fund	will	show	how	far	China	will	go	in	implementing	its	
vision	of	the	international	order,	and	whether	this	vision	will	be	
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based	on	China’s	history	or	influenced	by	the	West.	At	the	same	
time,	if	the	partners	begin	to	perceive	China	as	expansionist,	this	
may	be	another	barrier.	In	the	present	situation,	China’s	involve-
ment	in	the	Road’s	land	components,	i.e.	those	which	run	through	
Central	Asia	and	Pakistan,	is	likely	to	be	the	most	successful.	The	
prospects	for	the	Maritime	Road	have	deteriorated	as	a	result	of	
China’s	aggressive	expansion	in	the	South	China	Sea.
The question regarding the durability of this vision of the in-
ternational order as included in the New Silk Road concept 
remains open.	According	to	the	present	rules	of	succession	in	the	
Communist	Party	of	China,	the	vision	promoted	by	Xi	Jinping	will	
be	valid	during	the	term	of	his	rule,	 i.e.	until	2022.	 It	should	be	
expected	 that	 the	next	 leader	will	want	 to	present	 a	new	set	 of	
slogans	and	ideas.	At	the	same	time,	it	should	be	remembered	that	
the	previous	vision	promoted	by	Deng	Xiaoping	has	proved	to	be	
very	resistant	to	change,	and	has	continued	to	shape	China’s	be-
haviour	on	the	international	stage	for	over	30	years,	even	though	
subsequent	leaders	of	China	have	continued	to	add	their	own	in-
terpretations	to	it.
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